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4This article investigates the potential impact of a shift in market expectations about a
country’s eurozone entry date on long-term yields and the spot exchange rate in a
simple uncovered interest parity (UIP) framework. The results suggest that the size of
the reactions depend on how far the entry date is postponed, how far current inflation
is from the Maastricht-satisfying level, and whether the credibility of the central bank’s
target inflation path is sensitive to changes in the expected entry date. In the empiri-
cal part, the authors apply the framework for Hungary and draw some policy conclu-
sions for the timing of ERM II entry.
(JEL E42, E52, F33, F42)
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Abstract
56
A tanulmány Magyarország eurozóna-csatlakozására vonatkozó pénzpiaci várakozá-
sok megváltozásának lehetséges hatását vizsgálja az azonnali árfolyamra és a hosszú
lejáratú állampapír-piaci hozamokra egy egyszerû fedezetlen kamatparitáson alapuló
keretben. Az eredmények szerint a hatás nagysága függ attól, hogy milyen messzire
tolódik az euro bevezetésének idõpontja, milyen messze van az aktuális infláció a
maastrichti inflációs kritériumtól, és attól, hogy a jegybank által célzott inflációs pálya
hitelessége függ-e a várt eurobevezetési dátumtól. A tanulmány empirikus részében
a szerzõk Magyarország esetére alkalmazzák az elemzési keretet, és következtetése-
ket vonnak le az európai árfolyam mechanizmushoz (ERM-II) történõ csatlakozás idõ-
zítését illetõen.
Összefoglalás7
In the middle of 2004, ten countries – most of them from the Central and East
European region – joined the European Union (EU). All of the new member states are
required to adopt the euro in the future. Before introducing the euro, however, these
countries must fulfill the so-called Maastricht convergence criteria, but there is no
explicitly defined deadline for this. Financial markets form their own view about the
future date of entry to the eurozone of these countries. If a change in the circum-
stances persuades markets that the convergence process will be delayed, the
expected entry date may be shifted out. Because of the forward-looking nature of
financial markets, such a revision may affect current monetary conditions, i.e. the spot
exchange rate and long-term yields. Issing (2005) also notes that changes in these
expectations can result in sharp reversals in capital flows which expose the exchange
rate to large swings.  
There is a large body of literature analyzing how financial markets assess the outlook
of EU members of adopting the single currency in the future (see Bates, 1999 for a
review of this literature). This paper adds an important insight to the existing work: it
presents a simple framework which quantifies the potential size of the reaction of mon-
etary conditions to a change in the expected entry date. In addition, the paper pro-
vides important policy conclusions regarding the participation in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism II (ERM II), a necessary precondition to entering the eurozone.
The paper applies the method for the case of Hungary. From the ten new EU mem-
bers, Hungary presents an especially interesting and unique example as financial
markets’ expectations about the country’s eurozone prospects have shown remark-
able dynamics in recent years. Starting from rather optimistic expectations in 2001
and showing further improvement until mid-2002, the prospects have deteriorated
markedly by the end of 2004. Therefore the country presents an interesting example
for studying the impact of this dynamics on monetary conditions.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an assessment of the markets’
view on Hungary’s eurozone entry date using information from forint and euro yield
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curves. Section 3 describes a simple method which quantifies the potential impact of
an adverse shift in the expected entry date on the spot exchange rate and long-term
interest rates. Section 4 gives an illustration of the reactions of monetary conditions
implied by the method and presents an ex post comparison of changes in the
exchange rate and long-term yields with the changes predicted by the method pre-
sented in this article. Section 5 concludes with important policy implications for 
ERM II entry.9
2.1. Deriving expected entry dates from yield curves and surveys
Information on the markets’ expectation about Hungary’s eurozone entry date is avail-
able both directly and indirectly. Direct evidence is offered by regular polls of local
financial market analysts conducted by Reuters.
1 However, since these surveys start-
ed in 2003, they provide a rather limited time-span for analysis. 
It is also possible to gauge entry date expectations indirectly, making use of informa-
tion in the price of financial market instruments. According to Bates (1999), the basis
of these analyses can be Arrow-Debreu type contracts, currency options and yield
curves. Arrow-Debreu contracts for the eurozone entry of Hungary are not available,
and the time horizon of currency options for which there is enough data is not long
enough for this purpose. Therefore the analysis is based on the information from the
term structure of Hungarian yields.
The basis of the yield curve method is to compare implied forward interest rates
derived from zero-coupon yield curves in Hungary and in the eurozone. This approach
makes use of the fact that after adopting the euro, Hungarian nominal interest rates
will differ from eurozone nominal rates by only a small default risk premium. Since
implied forward rates are indicative of the markets’ expectation of future short interest
rates, the observed differential of one-year implied forwards in, say, 2009 depends on
the probability the market attaches to scenarios in which Hungary is already a full
member of the eurozone by that year. The higher this probability, the lower is the
implied forward differential for that particular year. Formally, FSt,T, the observed one-
year forward interest differential for year T, observed in t can be decomposed as the
following: 
2. Market expectations about the entry date
1 Reuters publishes monthly surveys since January, 2003, in which 10-15 macroeconomic analysts are asked about their
expectations regarding Hungary’s eurozone entry date. In addition, Reuters publishes quarterly surveys covering the
whole Central European region polling 35-40 analysts. As of May, 2004, only the regional polls provide information
about the expected eurozone entry date.Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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(1)
where                           is the probability at time t that the market attaches to scenar-
ios in which Hungary is a full member of eurozone by year T,                         is the
expected interest rate differential if Hungary is not in the eurozone by year T, while
i is the expected interest rate differential once Hungary is in the eurozone,
i.e. the expected default risk premium. Because of the currency risk,                      is
obviously greater than                    .
From (1), the implied probability of Hungary being a eurozone member by year T: 
(2)
FSt,T can be calculated from forint and euro zero coupon curves. For the other two
determinants of                     one has to make assumptions. Euro-denominated
Hungarian sovereign bonds currently trade around 20 basis points above euro swaps,
that is the default risk premium is already quite close to levels observable within the
eurozone. Therefore the authors assume a 20 basis point value for                    . 
More problematic is the choice of                          , that is the expected future interest
rate differential if Hungary stayed out of the eurozone. Interest rate differentials are
expected to decline from current levels for a number of reasons. First, with EU-mem-
bership, Hungary will be better able to differentiate itself as a ‘converging’ economy
and may get more insulated from financial contagion coming from emerging markets.
The result of this will be a decline in the currency risk premium and a shrinking of the
interest rate differential. Second, the exchange rate stability required during the run-
up to full eurozone membership can have a similar effect. Third, domestic interest
rates may decrease as a result of progress in disinflation.    
There are several approaches in the literature to approximate the value of  .
De Grauwe (1996) makes use of historical average of spreads, a J.P. Morgan study
(1997) uses international measures of risk, Favero et al. (1997) estimate a central bank
reaction function and Lund (1998) builds a model for the term structure. For reasons
of simplicity, this article uses historical averages of implied forward differentials.11
These differentials can be useful in approximating                        ,  but beyond a given
horizon, the possibility of eurozone membership is discounted into them as shown in
(1). Therefore, one should choose a future year in which Hungary is already an EU-
member but the probability of full eurozone membership is technically zero. For
instance, the year 2005 satisfies these conditions. Between the middle of 2001 and the
middle of 2004, the average of one-year implied forward differentials for 2005 was
around 430 basis points. Accordingly, the authors use a fixed value of 450 basis
points for an estimate of                         . However, the fact that forward differentials
exhibited significant volatility around this historical average (see Figure 1) points to the
limitations of such an approach and suggests that any results should be interpreted
with considerable caution.
To translate the implied probabilities into an implied entry date, the authors weight
each year from 2007 to 2013 with the corresponding incremental implied probabilities
and choose 2014 as the ‘terminal’ date for entry, receiving all the residual probability
(i.e. that of entering after 2013). It must be stressed here that one cannot plausibly
attribute extreme dates (e.g. beyond 2020) for the ‘terminal’ entry date, since Hunga-
ry does not have an opt-out from becoming a full member of the eurozone. As to the
sensitivity of the results to the terminal date: choosing 2015 would shift the results out
by around 3 months.
Figure 2 shows the Hodrick-Prescott trend of daily implied entry dates from July, 2001
onwards. Technically, it is possible to calculate implied entry dates for earlier periods
as well, but their interpretation would be problematic. The reason for this is that prior
to mid-2001, there was hardly any public debate on eurozone entry, so one can plau-
sibly assume that entry date expectations were probably not even formed before this
period. This is also reflected in the fact that it was only in January 2003, that Reuters
had started conducting surveys among local macro-analysts on the expected euro-
zone entry date. The average expected entry dates from these surveys are also
included in Figure 2. 
As it is clear from Figure 2, both the yield-curve and the survey-based expected euro-
zone entry dates showed a clear increasing trend from January, 2003. However, the
latter curve is considerably flatter than the estimates based on yield curves. In early
Market expectations about the entry dateMagyar Nemzeti Bank
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2003 the two curves were close to each other, but at the end of the sample the differ-
ence between them reached 1.5 years.
There are several factors which can explain the significantly higher entry dates calcu-
lated from yield curves. A straightforward explanation is that the expectations con-
cerning                           for the future years increased during 2003. One explanation
for this could be a worsening of economic fundamentals.
2 Indeed, from the second
half of 2003, markets started to become more and more concerned with the widening
of the current account deficit, which at the end of the year resulted in some market tur-
bulence. This may have been reflected not only in higher short term interest rates, but
also in an increase in                          , i.e. the expected future interest rate premium
over the eurozone interest rates in the case that Hungary does not join the eurozone.
If this is the case, equation (1) implies that the estimates of the expected entry dates
from yield curves are biased upwards in the second half of the sample since the
authors calculated with a fixed value for this premium.
Another possible explanation is that analysts, when asked about the entry date, give
the most probable value, i.e. the mode of their subjective probability distribution about
the entry date. However, when pricing financial assets such as long-term bonds, mar-
ket participants take into account less probable alternative scenarios as well, there-
fore bond prices reflect the expected value of the same subjective probability distri-
bution instead of the mode. If the distribution in the market’s view is strongly skewed
towards a later entry date – meaning that there is a much higher probability of a large
increase than a large fall in the expected entry date – the expected value is greater
than the mode. As a result, yield curve-based methods may give a later expected
entry date than survey-based methods.
It may be argued that the skewness of the market’s probability distribution increased
from 2003 onwards and thus the difference between expected entry dates from the
two information sources also widened. Because of the several instances of missed
fiscal targets and the growing uncertainty regarding the future of fiscal consolida-
tion, the role of official target dates in guiding market expectations was probably
2 See Favero et al. (1997) for a treatment of the role of the fundamentals in calculating the probability of joining the
eurozone.13
declining continuously. In practice this implies that while the mode of the market’s
subjective probability distribution may have stayed close to the official target date,
the skewness towards a later entry date may have increased.
As both explanations seem appropriate, one cannot say that either of the methods
clearly dominates the other in terms of reliability. While the yield curve method may
have some upward bias in the second half of the sample, the Reuters polls may be
underestimating the expected value of the entry dates. Thus, the expected entry date
of the market may be somewhere between the values suggested by the two methods.
2.2. The evolution of entry date expectations in 2001-2004 
In the last months of 2001, the implied entry date started to decline rapidly from the
previously high levels. The issue of the timing of Hungary’s eurozone entry started
to get attention in public debate around the middle of 2001. That was the time when
the central bank introduced an inflation targeting regime and argued that the path
of inflation targets should be set so that they allow the earliest possible eurozone
entry. Inflation dropped significantly in the last quarter of 2001, safely below the first
year-end target set by the MNB. Although this was only partly attributable to the new
monetary regime, it may have convinced market participants that the ‘early euro’
agenda can be taken seriously.  
The optimism of markets reached its peak in the first half of 2002 with an expected
entry date below 2008. The successful disinflation was important for Hungary’s euro-
zone prospects, because until the middle of 2002, it seemed that the only Maastricht
criterion that would pose a major challenge for Hungary was inflation. However, this
situation changed during the year 2002 because of the rapidly worsening fiscal out-
look. In 2002, the fiscal deficit exceeded 9% of GDP, far above the Maastricht criteri-
on of 3%. In the next two years, the prolonged uncertainties about the fiscal consoli-
dation necessary for complying with the Maastricht criteria have resulted in a steady
increase in the expected entry date. This is reflected in the increasing HP-trend of
implied entry dates from the middle of 2002 in Figure 2. 
Market expectations about the entry dateMagyar Nemzeti Bank
14
Against this background, setting official target dates did not help either. In August
2003, the government announced 2008 as the official target date, but the slowness of
the fiscal consolidation cast some doubt over the credibility of this target already at
the time of the announcement. Markets did not believe in the target date from the very
beginning, as it was clear from either survey evidence or the yield-curve based
method, both showing entry dates later than 2008. The announcement slowed down
the continuous postponement of the expected entry date, but only temporarily. The
government’s commitment proved to be short-lived. In the beginning of 2004, shortly
after it became known that the fiscal target for 2003 was missed by a large margin, the
government increased its target date to 2009-2010. Market expectations about the
entry date followed suit, showing a 2010-2011 date by mid-2004.15
When analyzing the impact of entry date expectations on monetary conditions, the arti-
cle focuses on two factors: future currency risk premia and inflation. More precisely,
the authors aim to assess the potential magnitude of changes in the expected future
path of the currency risk premium and inflation triggered by an outward shift in the
expected date of adopting the euro. These changes can then be translated into a
depreciation of the spot exchange rate and an increase in long-term interest rates,
using a risk premium-augmented version of the UIP condition.
As shown in the Appendix, the impact of a revision of entry date expectations on the
spot exchange rate can be written as:
(3)
where st denotes the nominal exchange rate, qt the real exchange rate, it the interest
rate, ρt the risk premium and πt the inflation rate. The variables st’, it’, ρt’ and πt’ denote
variables following a one-period shift in the expected entry date.     and     are vari-
ables purged of the long-run trend appreciation of the real exchange rate (see Appen-
dix for more details).
Suppose that the market expects that the authorities will try to enter the eurozone at
an ‘equilibrium’ real exchange rate (    ), which does not depend on the entry date.
3 In
this case, if expectations about T are shifted out by one year, the reaction of the spot
exchange rate depends on how the cumulated short interest rate differentials, risk pre-
mia and inflation differentials change as they are summed over a period one year
longer than before. 
3. Potential consequences of an adverse shift
in market expectations
3 Note that the trend appreciation is filtered out from     ; see the Appendix. Though in this paper the authors assume
that the rate of the trend appreciation (b) is constant in time, the results would not change if b was allowed to
diminish gradually in time, which would be perhaps more in line with the intuition. This is because the b parame-
ters in any given period would still cancel out.Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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To be able to derive the exact new paths of st, it and πt, (3) is obviously not sufficient.
If not a full macro model, one would need at least an equation describing inflation
dynamics and a monetary policy reaction function to obtain these. To calibrate such
equations is beyond the scope of this article.
4 The goal of the authors here is to gauge
the potential magnitude of the initial reactions in the exchange rate and long-term in-
terest rates to an adverse shift in expectations about entry date T. With the help of
some plausible assumptions about the Hungarian transmission mechanism and the
central bank’s behavior, this can be done without a formal calibrated model.  
One specific feature assumed about the monetary transmission mechanism is that the
exchange rate channel dominates the transmission and the direct role of the interest
rate channel is negligible. A number of stylized facts (e.g. the leverage and currency
composition of debt in the corporate sector, interest sensitivity of household con-
sumption, high degree of openness, etc.) point to this direction in Hungary. This
assumption is in accordance with those applied in the inflation forecast model of the
MNB, in which the interest rate channel is suppressed.
5 In such a set-up, the target
inflation path determines what exchange rate path the central bank is currently aiming
at and interest rate policy is used only to facilitate that path by offsetting any changes
in risk premia, without having a direct effect on inflation. This means that in (3), any
change in the inflation target path or the path of risk premia as a reaction to a delay in
eurozone entry will mechanically determine the path of short-term central bank inte-
rest rates. Therefore, what is of interest here is the likely reaction of the path of risk pre-
mia and the target inflation path to a delay in the expected eurozone entry date.
3.1. The credibility of the inflation target path
The impact of a delay in eurozone entry on monetary conditions depends strongly on
what monetary policy reaction market participants expect after the shift in expectations.
Since after an x-year shift, the Maastricht criterion on inflation must be fulfilled only x
4 Benczúr (2003) uses a small open economy macro model to trace out the path of these variables as a response to
shocks in expectations/regime switches. 
5 For more information on the MNB’s inflation forecasting model and a comparison with other accession country’s
models see Hornok and Jakab (2002).17
years later, the central bank may choose to stick to the original target inflation path but
it may as well modify it according to the new circumstances. Along this line, one can
distinguish between a ‘conservative’ and an ‘adaptive’ monetary policy reaction.
‘Conservative’ monetary policy
According to (3), the cumulated future risk premia increase for each year by which
eurozone entry is postponed. If monetary policy is perceived to be ‘conservative’, in
the sense that markets do not think that the inflation target path will be altered, then
they will also expect the central bank to increase short interest rates in the future to
fully offset the increase in future risk premia. This way the central bank defends the
exchange rate path that is required to achieve the target inflation path. In this ‘con-
servative’ case the spot exchange rate remains unchanged. However, as there is an
increase in expected future short-term interest rates, spot long-term interest rates will
rise. 
‘Adaptive’ monetary policy
On the other hand, market participants may think that following a shift in the entry date
to T’, the targeted path of disinflation will be adjusted as well to meet the Maastricht
criterion only at a later date, consistent with entry in T’. In this ‘adaptive’ case, beside
cumulated risk premia, the sum of expected inflation differentials increases as well.
Assuming a delayed disinflation path, the increase in the cumulated inflation differen-
tials is the area of the dark shaded parallelogram in Figure 3. This area is equal to the
difference of current inflation and the Maastricht-satisfying inflation multiplied by the
shift in the expected entry date.
6 It is important to note that this area is the bigger the
larger the gap between current inflation and the Maastricht-satisfying level and the fur-
ther away the entry date is postponed.
6 Figure 3 plots the annual inflation for Hungary but the difference between the two inflation paths would be the same if
one plotted the variable     , as one would only have to deduct b from both paths in that case. Similarly, the difference
between the two paths would not change if one plotted the inflation differentials vis-à-vis the eurozone.
Potential consequences of an adverse shift in market expectationsMagyar Nemzeti Bank
18
How this increase is divided between a depreciation of the spot exchange rate and
an increase in the spot (or expected future) short interest rates cannot be seen from
(3) alone. Since the sketched disinflation path determines the necessary path of the
exchange rate – because the authors assumed that the role of the interest rate chan-
nel is insignificant – the size of the depreciation of the spot exchange rate depends
on the speed of exchange rate pass-through. The increase in inflation is low at the
beginning of the modified inflation path and is at its maximum between the start of
the delayed disinflation and period T-1. If the pass-through is fast, the more sizeable
depreciation will take place only slightly before the start of the delayed disinflation,
i.e. in the future. However, if the pass-through is slow, a significant depreciation is
possible at present.19
4.1. Currency risk premia in the run-up to eurozone entry
The spot currency risk premium can be calculated from (4) if one has information
about exchange rate expectations. In Hungary, Reuters conducts a monthly survey of
market participants in which expected exchange rates for different horizons are col-
lected. Using the averages of exchange rate expectations from the survey, the spot
exchange rate as well as one-year forint and euro zero-coupon yields, a time series of
one-year currency risk premia is calculated for the period since the exchange rate
band of the forint was widened. 
In the sample period running from mid-2001 to mid-2003, the observed risk premia
ranged between 400-1200 basis points, with an average of 740 basis points. What is
of interest here is how risk premia is expected to come down form the current level to
zero at the time of entering the eurozone.
The stylized time profile of the currency risk premium assumed for the path to euro-
zone entry is sketched in Figure 4. Note that in the final years prior to eurozone entry,
a sizeable risk premium is assumed to be still around. This reflects the fact that cur-
rency risk premia is not likely to converge to zero gradually but rather in a sudden
move when the final conversion rate is announced. This is actually in line with the
experience of many earlier eurozone entrant countries. In other words, there always
remains a residual uncertainty until the conditions of eurozone entry are absolutely
sure and this is reflected in a flattening of the assumed risk premia profile at a posi-
tive level in the years immediately prior to eurozone entry. The key question is, at what
level this flattening is likely to take place. 
Because of the uncertainty about the future, it is extremely difficult to estimate the
size of the currency risk premium in the years immediately preceding eurozone
entry. If one assumes no particular anticipated movement in the nominal
exchange rate in years preceding eurozone entry, implied forward differentials for
these years can be used as a proxy for future risk premia. Therefore in the base-
4. Empirical applicationMagyar Nemzeti Bank
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line scenario, the authors use the same assumption for the annual currency risk
premia in pre-eurozone years as for                           in the previous section, that
is 450 basis points. This is roughly the average of implied forward differentials for
the year 2005 in the sample period running from mid-2001 to mid-2004. The
assumed risk premium is similar in magnitude to the interest rate differentials of
countries like Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece a few years before their entry into
the eurozone. In the years prior to the launch of the euro, short-term interest rates
in these countries were 200-300 basis points higher than those in Germany (see
Csajbók and Csermely, 2002). 
The assumed flattening profile of risk premia suggests that if the expected date of
eurozone entry shifts out by x years, the sum of one-year currency risk premia from
time t to eurozone entry increases by x times the pre-eurozone risk premium, that is x
times 450 basis points, as depicted in Figure 4.
4.2. Predicted response of monetary conditions under the baseline
scenario of risk premia
In the ‘conservative’ case, the increase in the future risk premia will be fully offset by
a rise in future short-term interest rates. According to the expectations hypothesis of
the term structure, long-term interest rates are an average of expected future short-
term rates. Therefore, spot ten-year yields increase by roughly 450/10 = 45 basis
points for each year by which the expected entry is postponed. The spot exchange
rate does not change in the case of ‘conservative’ monetary policy, regardless of the
current level of inflation.
In the ‘adaptive’ case, if for instance one assumes an initial inflation of 5% and a
Maastricht inflation criterion of approximately 3%, a one-year postponement of the
entry date results in a 1*(5-3) = 2 percentage point (the area of the parallelogram) rise
in the cumulated inflation differentials. This means that ten-year yields may increase
by another 20 basis points or the spot exchange rate may depreciate by as much as
2%. The quicker the pass-through the more delayed the reaction of the exchange rate
may be.21
4.3. Predicted response of monetary conditions under alternative
scenarios of risk premia
Since the calibration of the framework involves making assumptions about the future
evolution of risk premia, the authors also present alternative scenarios to illustrate the
sensitivity of the results to this choice. The high volatility of the proxy used for future
risk premia also underlines the need for this exercise. The authors choose two alter-
native scenarios for the risk premia: the average of implied forward differentials for the
year 2005 plus and minus the standard deviation observed in the sample. Given a
standard deviation of approximately 250 basis points, this implies a minimum of 200
and a maximum of 700 basis points.
In the first case, spot ten-year yields increase by 20 basis points, while in the second
case by 70 basis points for each year of postponement. The choice of the risk premi-
um only affects the predicted response of the long-term interest rates, while the
response of the spot exchange rate is only influenced by the inflation differentials, as
the exchange rate reacts to a shift in expectations only in the ‘adaptive’ case.
4.4. Eurozone entry date delays due to fiscal slippages
The estimated magnitudes of reactions in monetary conditions look small at first
glance, but they may become rather large if the eurozone entry date is shifted out
by more than one year. Such a situation might emerge quite easily. If, for example,
the trigger for the shift in expectations is a collapse in the credibility of fiscal con-
vergence, the new expected entry date may well be more than a year away from
the previous one. In the markets’ view, the lack of fiscal discipline may signal that
the incumbent government does not want to face the costs of complying with
Maastricht in the current political cycle. The new expected entry date in this case
can easily be shifted to the middle of the next political cycle, that is, by as much as
three years. This is precisely what happened in Hungary, where a continuous ero-
sion of the credibility of the fiscal convergence program between mid 2002 and
Empirical applicationMagyar Nemzeti Bank
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end-2004 contributed to a 3-year shift in the expected eurozone entry date during
the same period. Simply multiplying the baseline results for a one-year shift by
three suggests that in a situation where there is a 2% inflation differential vis-à-vis
the eurozone and monetary policy is perceived to be ‘adaptive’, ten-year yields
may increase by a minimum of 135 basis points and the spot exchange rate in the
worst case may depreciate by 6%. Moreover, this is only the pure timing effect of
the entry date shift and does not include any increase in risk premia or a revision
of the equilibrium exchange rate due to fiscal misbehavior. These factors can eas-
ily magnify the depreciation and yield increase following an outward shift of entry
date expectations. If a depreciation of this size takes place when the country is
already in ERM II, meeting the exchange rate stability criterion may become jeop-
ardized. This way, the shift in expectations about the entry date may turn out to be
self-fulfilling.
4.5. Changes in entry-date expectations and their consequences 
in the past
It is interesting to compare the actual changes of the exchange rate and long-term
yields in recent years with the baseline responses predicted by the model presented
here. When assessing the explanatory power of entry date expectations, one should
bare in mind that the model captures pure eurozone timing effects only, i.e. it does not
include the effect of changing expectations of fundamentals or risk premia on long-
term yields and the spot exchange rate.
Figure 5 shows the cumulated monthly changes in 10-year forint-euro yield differen-
tials and the range of changes potentially explained by pure eurozone timing effects.
7
The lower boundary of the range represents the ‘conservative’ monetary policy case.
The upper boundary represents the ‘adaptive’ monetary policy case with all the extra
inflation differentials assumed to affect long-term yields alone and not the spot
7 The eurozone timing effects were calculated using yield-curve based implied entry dates. The timing effects cal-
culated on the basis of survey evidence (Reuters polls) showed a broadly similar range but covered only a smaller
part of the sample, therefore these were not included in Figure 5.23
exchange rate.
8 The width of the range depends on the distance of current inflation
from the Maastricht-satisfying level, i.e. the size of cumulated future inflation differen-
tials if the central bank loosens its target disinflation path as a response to an outward
shift of the entry date. Since the model cannot tell how the effect of extra inflation dif-
ferentials generated in the ‘adaptive’ case by an outward shift in the entry date are
divided between an increase in long-term yields and spot depreciation, the pure tim-
ing effect of such a shift on long yields is somewhere between the two boundaries. 
Figure 5 suggests that changes eurozone entry date expectations may have
explained a sizable part of long-term yield movements in Hungary. Nevertheless,
beside these pure timing effects there were clearly other factors at play in shaping the
monthly movement of long-term yields. Yield differentials increased faster than pre-
dicted in summer 2002, when the new government’s spending program first raised
doubts about fiscal sustainability. Securing EU-entry in the last quarter of 2002 did not
effect eurozone entry date expectations but it had lead to a drop in long-term yields.
Both of these episodes may have had to do more with changes in expected future risk
premia than pure entry date effects. A similar episode took place in the last quarter of
2003, with the implied eurozone entry date shifting slightly outwards, but long-term
yields increasing much faster than predicted by the entry date shift. This was an
episode when financial market participants became seriously concerned about the
Hungarian fundamentals, primarily the sustainability of the country’s mounting current
account deficit. As a result, expectations about future risk premia may have increased,
which could have an additional effect on long-term yields beside the outward shift in
the expected entry date. 
Figure 6 depicts actual exchange rate movements together with those predicted by
the model. Since the model suggests that in the ‘conservative’ monetary policy case the
timing of eurozone entry does not have an effect on the spot exchange rate, Figure 6
contains the predicted exchange rate movement in the ‘adaptive’ case only. As the
8 The inflation differentials for the ‘adaptive’ case are calculated by taking the difference of actual inflation from the
Maastricht-level of inflation multiplied by the shift in the expected entry date. The authors emphasize that it is not
necessary to assign any value for b or πi* in this calculation exercise. The reason is that the method requires taking
the difference of two alternative future paths of     based on Figure 3, and this difference does not change if one
deducts b and πi* from both paths. One needs to quantify the Maastricht-level of inflation, though, for which the
authors assume a value of 3%.
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model cannot tell how the extra future inflation generated by a shift in the eurozone
entry in the ‘adaptive’ case is divided between the increase in long-term yields and
spot currency depreciation, it was assumed that the exchange rate picks up the full
effect of an entry date shift. Therefore, the predicted depreciation in Figure 6 should
be viewed as an upper boundary of the pure timing effect of eurozone entry.
It is clear that the model is much weaker in predicting movements in the spot exchange
rate compared to yield movements. Spectacular misses include mid-2003, when virtu-
ally unchanged expected entry dates coincided with a huge, 7% depreciation of the
exchange rate. The depreciation was triggered by a minor, but completely unexpected
devaluation of the central parity of the forint’s +/-15% fluctuation band. Another large
miss is the first quarter of 2004, when a rapid increase in the expected eurozone entry
date coincided with a quick and sizeable appreciation of the currency.
These episodes suggest that entry date expectations are not the only factor that influ-
ences current monetary conditions, and this can lead to situations where monetary
conditions do not move in accordance with the predictions of the model. Even the sim-
ple model presented here suggests that beside pure timing effects, long-term yields
and the spot exchange rate can be affected by (i) changes in expected future risk pre-
mia, (ii) changing views on fundamentals leading to a revision of the entry-date ‘equi-
librium’ real exchange rate, and (iii) changing perception of monetary policy type
(‘adaptive’ vs. ‘conservative’). 
Even the short period covered in this paper provides examples when these factors
modified or outweighed the pure timing effect of Hungary’s expected eurozone entry
on monetary conditions.
The unexpected devaluation of central parity in mid-2003, and the market’s possible
reading that such moves may even be repeated in the future may have increased both
current and expected future risk premia. Although the devaluation was initiated by the
government, it required the consent of the central bank as well. Thus, such a move
may have tilted the market’s perception of monetary policy towards a more ‘adaptive’
type.   
In the last quarter of 2003, the forint experienced a considerable depreciation, long-
term yields rose, while the implied entry date increased only slightly and the Reuters25
polls actually showed constant expected entry dates. One possible explanation for
this could be that markets did not revise the expected entry date in that period, but
rather the expected ‘equilibrium’ exchange rate at which Hungary would be able to
enter the eurozone at T. Indeed, since the last quarter of 2003, the sustainability of
Hungary’s external deficit and the issue of where the ‘equilibrium’ exchange rate may
be, attracted a lot of market attention. Following (3), such a revision of the ‘equilibri-
um’ real exchange rate at which the country may enter the eurozone implies that the
spot exchange rate depreciates, regardless of any change in the expected entry date. 
Another episode when pure timing effects did not even explain the direction of
exchange rate and yield movements is the first quarter of 2004, when both the survey
and the yield-curve based expected entry dates increased relatively quickly, while the
currency appreciated significantly and long-term yields dropped as well. It is difficult to
explain these movements with a changing perception of fundamentals since neither the
fiscal outlook nor external balance showed a marked improvement in this period.
However, in the same period the central bank surprised markets by keeping short-term
rates high. Such a hawkish move may have changed the market’s perception about the
type of monetary policy from an ‘adaptive’ type towards a more ‘conservative’ type.
According to the model presented in Section 2, such reclassification of central bank
behavior may lead to a reversal of previous depreciations and yield increases.
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In EU member states which are to join the eurozone, financial markets form their own
view about the likely entry date based on a number of factors (e.g. the official target
date set by the government, economic fundamentals, the credibility of the conver-
gence process, etc). If the convergence process gets derailed for some reason, an
adverse revision of entry date expectations may take place. Because of the forward-
looking nature of financial markets, such a postponement of the expected entry date
will immediately be reflected in long-term yields and the spot exchange rate. The
assessment presented in this article showed that a serious (three-year) outward shift
in the entry date would inevitably result in the increase of long-term yields. If, the cen-
tral bank is perceived to behave ‘adaptively’, i.e. as a result of the more distant entry
date the targeted inflation path becomes less credible, there may be pressure for a
sizeable depreciation as well. The further away current inflation is from the Maastricht-
satisfying level, the bigger the size of this depreciation can be. In such a situation, if
the country is already in ERM II, meeting the exchange rate stability criterion may
become jeopardized. This way, the shift in expectations about the entry date may turn
out to be self-fulfilling.
Therefore, the tentative conclusion from this analysis is that Hungary should not push
for ERM II participation as long as (a) fiscal convergence is not safely on track and
(b) the credibility of the medium-term inflation target path is not sound and (c) infla-
tion is relatively high above the level consistent with the Maastricht criterion. If, how-
ever, any of these conditions change for the better, a revision of entry date expecta-
tions is less likely or has a more limited impact on the exchange rate. In this case, the
risks of breaching the exchange rate stability criterion within ERM II become more
contained.
The analysis of this article also highlights the importance of having a credible
commitment of the central bank towards a long-run objective of price stability that
is not contingent upon the convergence path. The adoption of a constant medium-
term inflation target – if it is considered credible by markets – can help mitigate
5. ConclusionConclusion
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the market reactions to a shift in expected eurozone entry by stabilizing longer-
term inflation expectations. 
One limitation of the conclusion presented here is that it does not consider the poten-
tial stabilizing effect, which the ERM II-membership itself may have on entry date
expectations. Further research into this question is necessary.28
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Figure 2











































































































































































































Stylized inflation paths in the ‘adaptive’ monetary policy case
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Figure 5



































































































































































































































































































































































































A simple framework for analyzing the effect of entry-date 
expectations on monetary conditions
According to the UIP condition (4), the differential between nominal interest rates on
domestic and foreign (euro-denominated) bonds (it – i*t) equals the expected depre-
ciation (                    ), the currency risk premium ( ) and the default risk premium.
9
As the default risk on Hungarian sovereign bonds is already quite small and is
expected to change only little in the run-up to the euro, this term is suppressed in the
following.
(4)
By expressing st from (4) and iterating expectations forward up to the expected euro-
zone entry date (T ), one can obtain:
(5)
The entry date nominal exchange rate (sT) equals the sum of the initial real exchange
rate (qt), the cumulated change in the real exchange rate (dqt), the initial price level
difference (pt – pt*) and the cumulated inflation differentials (πt – πt*): 
(6)
Appendix
9 Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk. An increase in st means a depreciation of the domestic currency.Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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The change in the real exchange rate (dqi) in period i can be decomposed into a term
purged of the long-run trend (      ) and a trend appreciation (–b):
10
(7)
At this point, the authors introduce a new variable     , which is the difference of home
inflation (    ) and b:
(8)
Equation (6) can be transformed into the following form using (7):
(9)
Equation (8) implies that:
(10)
Applying (10) and introducing a new variable for the real exchange rate purged of the
long-run trend (                       ), equation (9) can be rewritten as:
(11)
Substituting (11) into (6), one gets the following expression for the spot exchange rate:
(12)
10 Where b is positive and can be interpreted as the annual percentage appreciation of the real exchange rate due
to the catching-up process of the Hungarian economy. There is a wide literature on this phenomenon, for instance
Égert et al. (2003) note that trend appreciation has become a stylized fact for the transition countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and can be explained with the Balassa-Samuelson effect and an increase in tradable prices attrib-
utable to quality improvements. Further estimates of the Balassa-Samuelson effect are provided among others by
Mihaljek et al. (2004) and Kovács (2002).37
Without restricting generality, one can normalize it*, πt* and pt* variables to zero, so
that it,      and pt denote the difference of home and foreign variables:
(13)
Equation (13) illustrates the connection between market expectations about eurozone
entry date (T) and the spot exchange rate. If the expected entry date is shifted out by
one year, the spot exchange rate can be written as:
(14)
Thus the impact of a revision of entry date expectations on the spot exchange rate is:
(15)
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